The chart below offers an overview of our opinion pool’s current take on risks of new mass-killing episodes in countries around the world. In contrast to our statistical risk assessments, which focus exclusively on state-led mass killings, these assessments cover all possible mass killings, state-led and non-state alike. Specifically, each question asks: “Before 1 January 2016, will there be a new episode of mass killing in [this country]?”
In the chart, the red dots mark the collective forecast as of July 1. The black bars show the range of all individual forecasts made on each question since its launch, providing some indication of the pool's collective uncertainty about each case.
A few results of note:
Our pool continues to identify Iraq as the country most likely to see a new episode of mass killing this year, and the assessed risk has actually increased in recent months, from a little over 50 percent in early April to 75 percent now. That assessment accounts for the fact that Islamic State is already perpetrating a mass killing in Iraq, and comments on the pool suggest that forecasters see a mass killing perpetrated by Shiite militias with state complicity as the most likely scenario for a new episode.
Myanmar rose from sixth to third on an increase of five percentage points in its estimated risk, from 20 to 25 percent. Although the plight of the country’s Rohingya minority garnered much attention in recent weeks, comments on the opinion pool focused on a flare-up in fighting between government forces and Kokang rebels near the border with China. This fact suggests that the increase in estimated risk since April had more to do with an expansion of plausible scenarios for new mass killings in Myanmar than any change in circumstances for the Rohingya, a situation we do not (yet) identify as an ongoing mass killing.
The pool currently sees a 20-percent chance of new episodes of mass killing in South Sudanthis year, ranking it fourth on this list. That forecast may seem surprisingly low in light of recent reports of continued fighting and atrocities between state forces and rebels led by Riek Machar, but we consider both of those belligerents to be perpetrating ongoing episodes of mass killing, so this forecast concerns the possibility of yet-another episode, either targeting a different group or involving a different non-state perpetrator.
The pool cut Kenya‘s assessed risk in half since April, dropping it from about 20 percent to less than 10 percent. As a result, it moved from third to fourteenth on the rank-ordered list. Forecasters posted few comments on this question, so it’s difficult to say why the assessment changed, but it appears to stem from a slowdown in the pace of lethal attacks by Al Shabaab, which committed a number of mass murders in Kenya in early 2015.
Meanwhile, Cameroon climbed into the fifth spot on our pool’s list, with an assessed risk of 15 percent, apparently in response to concerns about the persistence of large-scale attacks by Boko Haram on towns near the Nigerian border. By contrast, Chad and Niger rank much lower, with assessed risks of 5 and 1 percent, respectively, despite related attacks inside their borders in recent months.
Since our last opinion-pool overview in early April, Burundi has experienced persistent social unrest, the flight of tens of thousands of citizens, and a failed coup in response to President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to stand for a questionably constitutional third term. During that time, its estimated risk rose from 7 percent to a peak of 16 percent in early May, but it has since declined to 10 percent, leaving Burundi eleventh on our pool’s risk list as of today. This trajectory implies that our pool continues to see mass killing as an unlikely outcome of Burundi’s tumultuous election season, though certainly not an impossible one.