

Session 4
Endgame – Lessons from Srebrenica
Documents List

Page No.	Date	Author	Title	Source	Notes
4-1	13-Jul-1995	Christopher	Next Steps in Bosnia	State Department // Archive FOIA	
4-4	17-Jul-1995	Block	Bodies Pile Up in Horror of Srebrenica	<i>The Independent</i> (newspaper)	
4-5	13-Jul-1995	U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Group of People: Sandici, Bosnia and Herzegovina	ICTY	
4-5	14-Jul-1995	Studio B	[Piles of Bodies]	Studio B	Broadcast on Serb TV
4-6	14-Jul-1995	Mladic	Meeting with President Milosevic, Bildt, and General de la Presle	USHMM Mladic Files	
4-7	17-Jul-1995	Akashi	Meeting in Belgrade	ICTY	excerpt from original document (page 1-2 of 3)
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4-17	26-Jul-1995	Baxter	Meeting Notes General Smith / General Mladic 25 July	ICTY	
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4-21	11-Aug-1995	Albright	Croatia, Bosnia: Amb Albright Briefs Security Council on Possible Mass Graves Near Srebrenica...	Dept of State // Archive FOIA	excerpt from original document (page 2-3 of 6)

*Box around text denotes portion of document highlighted for conference discussion.

4-23	13-Jul-1995	U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Bus Convoy: Nova Kasaba, Bosnia and Herzegovina	ICTY	
4-23	27-Jul-1995	U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Disturbed Earth: Nova Kasaba, Bosnia and Herzegovina	ICTY	
4-24	13-Jul-1995	U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Areas of Disturbed Earth: Nova Kasaba, Bosnia and Herzegovina	ICTY	
4-24	27-Jul-1995	U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Areas of Disturbed Earth: Nova Kasaba, Bosnia and Herzegovina	ICTY	
4-25	18-Aug-1995	Rohde	Evidence Indicates Bosnia Massacre	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	excerpt of original article
4-26	25-Aug-1995	Rohde	How a Serb Massacre Was Exposed	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	
4-29	July 1995 - September 1995	Galbraith	Extracts from Diary of US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith	National Defense University	excerpts of original documents
4-39	29-Oct-1995	Dobbs / Smith	New Proof Offered of Serb Atrocities	<i>The Washington Post</i>	

*Box around text denotes portion of document highlighted for conference discussion.

4-1

*** Wang VS File Display Utility - Version 4.50.01 *** 07/18/95 11:09 Page 1
Consecutive File 4164196M in Library @NOTESXX on Volume VOL88E

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SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH BOSNIAN PRIME
MINISTER SILAJDZIC

- 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. NODIS MERCURY DECAPIIONED
- 2. THIS CABLE CONTAINS A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF THE SECRETARY'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BOSNIAN PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC ON JULY 13, 1995. THE PRIME MINISTER INITIATED THE CALL. I ASK THAT YOU NOT PERMIT COPIES TO BE MADE OF THIS MESSAGE, AND THAT YOU DO NOT DISTRIBUTE IT OUTSIDE OF THE MISSION'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE. DEPARTMENT RECIPIENTS SHOULD NOT DISTRIBUTE OUTSIDE THE BUREAU'S FRONT OFFICE.
- 3. BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

DATE: THURSDAY, JULY 13, 1995

TIME: 1902 EDT

PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY AND BOSNIAN PRIME MINISTER
SILAJDZIC

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN BOSNIA

PM SILAJDZIC BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY REPORTING THAT REFUGEES ON THEIR WAY TO TUZLA ARE REPORTING HUNDREDS OF DEAD BODIES LYING BY THE ROAD. NOTING PRESIDENT CHIRAC HAD PROPOSED TAKING ACTION, SILAJDZIC ASKED THE SECRETARY IF HE WOULD SUPPORT THE FRENCH. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT CHIPAC'S PROPOSALS WERE NOT CLEAR. THE U.S. POSITION WILL DEPEND ON WHAT THE FRENCH PROPOSE AND WHETHER THE PROPOSAL IS MILITARILY FEASIBLE. HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE ALSO DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT WITHIN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

SILAJDZIC TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE ATTACKING ZEPA AND WERE PLANNING TO ATTACK GORAZDE. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE SECRETARY, HE SAID THE SERBS HAD PRESENTED AN ULTIMATUM TO THE DEFENDERS OF ZEPA AND WERE SHELLING GORAZDE SPORADICALLY. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED

OPD287
#11

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer

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ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE EASTERN ENCLAVES. NOTING THE AMBIGUITY OF SILAJDZIC'S RECENT STATEMENTS ON THE FUTURE OF UNPROFOR, THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. BELIEVES UNPROFOR STILL HAS A ROLE TO PLAY. THE QUESTION IS HOW UNPROFOR CAN BE STRENGTHENED.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT PROVOKED THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO STRIKE SREBRENICA WHEN THEY DID, BUT SPECULATED THAT THE IMMINENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE (RRF) COULD HAVE BEEN A FACTOR. SILAJDZIC'S VIEW WAS THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS WANTED TO FREE UP TROOPS TO FIGHT ELSEWHERE. HE ADDED THAT THE SERBS KNOW THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL IN THE HAGUE WILL SOON BRAND THEM AS WAR CRIMINALS. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION ABOUT THE UTILITY OF FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH MILOSEVIC, THE BOSNIAN PM SAID MILOSEVIC IS NOW OPENLY BACK IN BOSNIA. THE SERBS, HE CONTINUED, ARE NOT EVEN TRYING TO HIDE THE FACT THAT THEY ARE RUNNING OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA FROM BELGRADE. SILAJDZIC SAID HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD DO ANY GOOD TO TALK TO MILOSEVIC.

THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW MANY TROOPS THE GOBH HAD IN GORAZDE AND WHETHER SILAJDZIC THOUGHT THE CITY WAS DEFENSIBLE. THE BOSNIAN PM REPLIED THAT GORAZDE COULD ONLY BE DEFENDED FOR A LIMITED TIME OWING TO SHORTAGES OF AMMUNITION AND OTHER SUPPLIES. HE SAID THE BOSNIAN

SERBS HAD NO SUCH CONCERNS DUE TO THE PROXIMITY OF SERBIA. HE OFFERED TO SEND THE SECRETARY A MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT. THE SECRETARY TOLD SILAJDZIC THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD MET WITH SENIOR U.S. MILITARY COMMANDERS AND SPOKEN BY TELEPHONE WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND CHANCELLOR KOHL. THE PRESIDENT ALSO PLANNED TO CALL PRIME MINISTER MAJOR. HE ADDED THAT THE MATTER IS UNDER INTENSIVE DISCUSSION. WE MUST SEE IF THERE IS SOME WAY WE CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND STEM THIS TIDE, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED. THERE IS INTENSE ACTIVITY AIMED AT FORGING A COMMON POSITION. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT CHIRAC'S POSITION IS AN ALL-OR NOTHING POSITION AND ONE HE WOULD NOT SUBSCRIBE TO. HE SAID HE HOPED SILAJDZIC DID NOT FAVOR A UN WITHDRAWAL.

SILAJDZIC SAID THE RRF SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO ZEPA AND GORAZDE. CHIRAC IS RIGHT IN PRINCIPLE: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST ACT QUICKLY AND SHOW DETERMINATION. SREBRENICA, HE ADDED, WAS A TOTAL BETRAYAL. UN PEACEKEEPERS CALLED FOR AIR SUPPORT AS SOON AS THE SERBS ENTERED THE SAFE AREA, BUT COMMUNICATIONS WERE DOWN FOR TWO HOURS. SILAJDZIC CHARACTERIZED THE BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION AS VERY SUSPICIOUS AND SAID HE FEARED A SIMILAR DELAY IF

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R12

UKRAINIAN PEACEKEEPERS IN ZEPA ARE CONFRONTED WITH A SERB ATTACK. FORTY THOUSAND PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING BECAUSE OF AKASHI, THE PM SAID. BOSNIA IS GOING TO BE A PROBLEM FOR MANY YEARS TO COME IF THIS HAPPENS, HE CONTINUED. DO NOT LET IT HAPPEN, HE PLEADED.

THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST. HE WARNED SILAJDZIC THAT CALLING FOR UN WITHDRAWAL ONLY PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO WANT TO ACCELERATE THE WAR. SILAJDZIC ENDED THE CONVERSATION BY NOTING THAT THE ONLY WAY TO KNOW IF CHIRAC IS SERIOUS IS TO JOIN HIM FOR ACTION. WE MUST SAVE ZEPA, HE SAID. PLEASE HELP SEND THE RRF AND PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT.

THE CALL ENDED AT 1915.
4. END TEXT.
CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

PTP2195

SECRET

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PAGE 01 STATE 169976 150202Z

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4-4

Bodies pile up in horror of Srebrenica

ROBERT BLOCK Belgrade

Monday, 17 July 1995

The video camera panned across the ground in front of the anonymous building in Srebrenica for perhaps four or five seconds, but it was time enough to freeze the blood in any television viewer's veins.

The area was full of what at first glance appeared to be bundles of abandoned belongings, clothes mainly, piled up higgledy-piggledy at the foot of a wall pock-marked with bullet holes. It was not until the Belgrade reporter made his comment that the gruesome reality of the pile struck home.

"There are many dead Muslim soldiers," the reporter said as the picture of the wall abruptly dissolved into footage of Bosnian Serb soldiers riding triumphantly through Srebrenica on horseback. "Go back to the shot of the wall and stop it there," I shouted. When the technician stopped the film, there it was in freeze frame: the horror of Srebrenica in piles two feet high. The bundles were clearly not empty clothes. They had heads, arms and legs. The fit body of a young man in the foreground filled out a white T-shirt. The bodies up against the wall looked to be three deep in places. It was impossible to make out the exact number, but 25 would be a reasonable guess.


At about shoulder height above the bodies were what appeared to be brownish-red blotches on the yellowish wall and dark sticky-looking stains on the black garage doors behind the cadavers. There were bullet holes everywhere.

The implication of the report by the independent Serb television channel, Studo B, which was not overtly pro-Bosnian Serb but clearly sympathetic, was that these were Muslim soldiers killed in combat. The scene, however, looked more like a place of summary execution than of combat.

The film was made last Thursday, two days after Srebrenica was overrun by Bosnian Serb soldiers. The footage of the bodies appears to support the testimony of refugees from Srebrenica who claim that they saw men dragged away by Serb soldiers, heard gunshots and later saw bodies against walls or ditches on the roadside. Muslim soldiers from Srebrenica are especially hated by the Serbs for waging a guerilla war against them during the conflict.

The Bosnian Serb army commander, General Ratko Mladic, reportedly telephoned a Dutch United Nations officer last week to tell him that there were "hundreds" of dead bodies around Srebrenica. He was quoted by a UN official as saying that the Serbs had been forced to kill "lots of people because they were trying to break out of Srebrenica". The fate of the menfolk of Srebrenica has been a concern to their families and international human rights since the enclave fell last Tuesday. A delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross was prohibited again yesterday from visiting Bratunac, the town near Srebrenica where many of the captured Muslim men are believed to be held.

The reports that men of draft age were separated from the women for "screening" were substantiated by the film. A group of Muslim men are shown on their knees on the second storey balcony of a house in town. The men peer helplessly at the camera through the wooden rails. Their humiliation and fear are clearly visible in their eyes.



RE-TRANSCRIBED - SOURCE - USHMM Mladic Files (ICTY)
- Excerpt from Mladic's personal diary -

0668-1154-0668-116-ET7Translation

/entire document is handwritten/:

1B

14 July 1995
2115 hours

MEETING

with President Milosevic, Bildt, and General De la Presle

***President Milosevic**

-Explained the situation around Srebrenica

***Accepted**

A) 1. - ICRC - access to r/z prisoners of war/

2. - To approve UNHCR and convoys with supplies for population

3. - Exclusive right for UN police to be in Srebrenica and Zepa and that everyone can return

to

their places if they want.

B) To approve convoys with supplies for Sarajevo from the direction of Kiseljak with regular procedure

2. B

announcement, control, escort

BILDT:

- To accomplish something over the weekend or we are going to get ourselves in trouble

- Srebrenica - to free the boys - young men who were taken to Bratunac.

*Liberation of Dutch soldiers

* To free at least 48 or 86 Dutch soldiers who are with us

* Srebrenica and Zepa to be demilitarized

CZN-1162
CZG-945
SSN-1763

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ONLY -1006Z
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA ONLY -1011Z
FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB
NUMBER: Z - 1175
DATE: 17 JULY 1995
SUBJECT: MEETING IN BELGRADE

Y. Akashi

UNPF
COMMITTEE
#9212
'95 JUL 17 -9 58

Mr. Carl Bildt, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and myself met in Belgrade with President Milosevic on Saturday, 15 July. I was accompanied by General Rupert Smith. Milosevic, at the request of Bildt, facilitated the presence of General Mladic at the meeting. Mladic and Smith had a long bilateral discussion. Despite their disagreement on several points, the meeting re-established dialogue between the two Generals. Informal agreement was reached in the course of the meeting on a number of points between the two Generals which will, however, have to be confirmed at their meeting scheduled for 19 July. In view of the highly sensitive nature of the presence of Mladic at the meeting, it was agreed by all participants that this fact should not be mentioned at all in public.

Please find attached summary of main points discussed.

Regards.

UNPF
COMMITTEE
#1901
'95 JUL 17 10:11

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SRGG

R0013505

UNDERSTANDINGS FROM BELGRADE DISCUSSIONSSITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA15 JULY 1995GENERAL PRESS LINE

Mr. Akashi, at his request and in the presence of Mr. Bildt and Mr. Stoltenberg, was informed of certain possible relaxations in the Bosnian Serb position.

The specific agreements will be revealed after the meeting of General Mladic and General Smith, scheduled for Wednesday 19 July 1995.

SREBRENICA

Full access to the area for UNHCR and ICRC

UNPROFOR resupply via Belgrade-Ljubovija-Bratunac. Requests for convoys to be submitted 17 July 1995

Permission for UNPROFOR troops, including equipment, to leave. CO Dutchbat to assess transport lift required, and to inform Serbs and UNPROFOR. Generals Smith and Mladic will observe the move, planned for 21 July 1995 or shortly thereafter. Route to be via Bratunac.

ICRC to have immediate access to "prisoners of war" to assess their welfare, register, and review procedures at Bosnian Serb reception centre in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

UNPROFOR to organize immediate evacuation of injured from Potocari and Bratunac, including provision of ambulances

UN presence in one form or another is agreed in key areas.

UNPROFOR to arrange resupply to Dutchbat, including fuel, on route Zvornik-Bratunac

GORAZDE AND ZEPA

Freedom of movement for UNHCR and UNPROFOR forces to and from the enclaves. Route to be through Belgrade-Visegrad.

Troop rotation (Ukrainians) may take place.

SARAJEVO

Land access corridor Kiseljak-S1-Ilidza-Sarajevo. Freedom for normal traffic and UNPROFOR.

UN protection and escort according to circumstances. One

R0013506

CZK-67
SSN-1786

R0107103

CNZ 611 CYZ 633 P1/1

SSN-924

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG & FC
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA *(please copy Annan in Geneva)*
INFO: AKASHI, SARAJEVO attn Smith
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *Shahiporan*
DATE: 18 JULY 1995
NUMBER: 2381
SUBJECT: Human Rights Violations by Bosnian Serbs

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
OPERATIONS
18 JUL 19 12 02 00

You will, no doubt, have read and heard the extensive reports of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs during their recent takeover of Srebrenica. While many of these reports emerge from refugees, they are widespread and consistent, and have been given credence by a variety of International observers, including UNHCR. We have, however, received nothing on the subject from UNPROFOR.

We understand that the Dutch peace-keepers who have been evacuated from Srebrenica may be reticent to speak on the subject out of regard for the safety and security of their colleagues taken hostage by the Serbs. Nonetheless, it is their duty to report comprehensively to you about what they have seen, and we hope you are taking steps to collect first-hand information from all United Nations personnel who are or were present in the area. Our inability to corroborate (or authoritatively contradict) any of the allegations currently being made, many of which involve events of which UNPROFOR in Potocari could not have been unaware, is causing mounting concern here. It also does little for our credibility with the International community at large.

We would appreciate your comments, as well as any substantive information, as soon as possible. Best regards.

SRSG/FC/DO SRSG/DOA/PLA/OI/DFC/COB/ICFY



UNCLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

'95 JUL 19 P12:27

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

July 19, 1995

S/S

[Redacted]

TO: The Secretary

FROM: DRL - John Shattuck ^B

SUBJECT: Defense of the Safe Areas in Bosnia

The surrender of Srebrenica to Bosnian Serbs has resulted in both a humanitarian and human rights tragedy. Once again boys and men have been rounded up and put in special camps to await an uncertain fate. Women have been kidnapped, beaten, and raped, and the destruction of Srebrenica is now being repeated in Zepa.

The human rights abuses we are seeing harken back to the very worst, early days of "ethnic cleansing." In Bratunac, 4,000-5,200 men and boys are incarcerated and the Bosnian Serbs continue to deny ICRC access to them. Another 3,000 soldiers died as they fled Srebrenica, some taking their own lives rather than risk falling into Serb hands. There are credible reports of summary executions and the kidnapping and rape of Bosnian women. These are outrageous and illegal acts and are causing the greatest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II. Tens of thousands of people are not accounted for, and 30,000 people are homeless.

We know from these recent and past events what will happen if the Bosnian Serbs' "ethnic cleansing" campaign is not stopped. And we know that the ever growing refugee problem poses both a humanitarian catastrophe and a security problem as population flows disrupt the delicate balance in the Bosnian Federation and neighboring countries. On human rights and humanitarian grounds alone, the disaster of Srebrenica demands that the international community use the authority it has to protect the remaining safe areas, including through the use of military force.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR [✓] Date: 2/17/98
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 EXCISE DECLASSIFY EO Citations _____
 DENY IN PART

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ CLASSIFY as S or C Sec. _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

In the Spring of 1993, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolutions 819 and 824 establishing the six safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Bihac. Shortly thereafter, the UNSC adopted resolution 836, authorizing the use of force to protect the safe areas and clearly stating that the safe areas were designed both to prevent future ethnic cleansing and to lay the groundwork for reversing the gains Bosnian Serbs had made through this "unlawful and totally unacceptable" practice.

The international community's promise was clear, proper and well-considered. Together with the War Crimes Tribunal, establishment of the safe areas represented a tangible -- and until Srebrenica, largely successful -- effort by the international community to staunch the horrors associated with ethnic cleansing. Now, however, without full, forceful support, the remaining safe areas are likely to fall. Then, the civilian population that relied on us and the UN will suffer the same fate as the people of Srebrenica, severely damaging U.S., NATO and UN credibility.

For these reasons, I believe we must take all necessary military measures to protect Gorazde and the other safe areas, even as we also make certain that sanctions relief is tied to a mechanism that ensures full cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal. Failure to act now not only will deepen the human rights and refugee crisis, but also is likely to lead to the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission. The U.S. then will find itself in an untenable position. U.S. troops will be on the ground helping the UN force to pull out while Bosnian Serbs and possibly even desperate government forces fire upon them, and fearful civilians try to block their exit.

I know you share my deep distress over events in Bosnia, and I realize that defending the safe areas may require an uphill battle with Congress. Nonetheless, we and the nation are at a crucial juncture. The human rights rationale for defending the safe areas is clear and compelling, and can persuade the American people.

UNCLASSIFIED

4-12

R0082071

CZN 1185
CZG 962
SSN 1791

OUTGOING CABLE
MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPROF
COMMUNICATIONS

95 JUL 19 14:17

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 1/2

INFO: AKASHI, ICFY, GENEVA
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB *AM*

DATE: 19 JULY 1995

NUMBER: Z - 1198

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF DISPLACED PERSONS FROM SREBRENICA

1. With reference to your cables 2354 and 2381 and further to our cable Z-1187 of the 17 July on the situation in Tuzla, the following summary is drawn from the meeting of the Emergency Group in Zagreb chaired by the Head of Civil Affairs. The meeting specifically addressed the issues relating to disposition of Displaced Persons (DP's) and allegations of Human right violations.

2. The Joint Crises Action Team (JCAT) that 6600 DP's are accommodated by UNPROFOR in the Tuzla Airbase. BiH local authorities report that 18333 DP's are accommodated in Collective Centres with the distribution as follows: Tuzla town 500; Banovici 3500; Gracanica 1510; Srebrenik 3227; Lukavac 3617; Zivinice 3979; Kladanj 500; Dubrave 1500; ICRC confirm they have evacuated 88 casualties from Bratunac to Tuzla.

3. The total number of DP's that have reached Tuzla as at 19 July is therefore approximately 25000. Accepting that the figures of DP's in Collective Centres offered by BiH local authorities has not been independently confirmed, this 25000 DP's in the Tuzla region provides a useful approximation with which to work. In 1993, UNPROFOR estimated the population of Srebrenica to be 42000. By a process of deduction, it can therefore be determined that approximately 17000 DP's are currently unaccounted for.

4. This figure of 17000 can be further subdivided to provide a narrower range of missing DP's. In doing so however, it should be realised that the figures become less reliable as the sources are not even loosely confirmed. ABiH 2nd Corp report a further 4000 DP's, mostly soldiers but including some civilians, have entered the Tuzla area having been involved in a fighting withdrawal from Srebrenica. BiH authorities inform that a further 4-5000 DP's can be expected to arrive in this manner. When deducted

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95 JUL 19 14:26
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UNPROF
COMMUNICATIONS

from the broad figure of 17000 missing DP's, these figures would reduce the unaccounted number to 4-8000. Due to the imprecise nature of these figures, we recommend that any public statements are limited to the broad reference of several thousand missing.

5. Despite political and military negotiations at the highest level, the BSA still refuse to grant ICRC access to detainees. One exception to this has been the registering of the 23 casualties which BSA refused ICRC permission to evacuate from Bratunac.

6. Any further refinement of the number of missing DP's is dependant on access to detainees held by BSA and, confirmation of BiH figures on those reaching Tuzla by fighting withdrawal.

7. The Humanitarian situation in Tuzla is stable but UNHCR report the main concerns relate to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. The security of the DP's in the Tuzla airbase also remains a concern in case of targeting by BSA artillery. UNPROFOR report that a single shell was fired by the BSA into Tuzla town in the afternoon of 18 July which killed one civilian and injured a further six.

8. Mr Wieland, Representative for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has arrived in Tuzla to assess the situation and Mr Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur is expected to arrive at the weekend. In addition UN Civil Affairs Officers with specific Human Rights training have begun work in Tuzla interviewing the Srebrenica DP's. As soon as information is available from these sources it will be released to you. In order to ensure even better coordination with UNPROFOR BH Command, the Head of Civil Affairs has strengthened the Civil Affairs complement in Sarajevo and one Civil Affairs colleague has been despatched to Zenica in order to join an emergency team set up by UNHCR to deal with any further developments in the eastern enclaves. UNHCR report that in conjunction with BiH local authorities, accommodation is being identified in the area of Zenica which could be used in the event of further DP arrivals.


9. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) report that they have received clearance from the Croatian Government to transport 15 local staff and family members through Croatian territory to Tuzla. These local staff are currently with DUTCHBAT in Potocari awaiting written clearance from Belgrade to cross into Serbia, a matter which has not yet been resolved. UNPROFOR have made arrangements to transport these persons by UN aircraft from Belgrade to Zagreb in the event of clearance being granted. A copy of the letter from UNPF to MSF relating to this matter is attached.

10. The situation in Zepa remains most critical. Only one of the nine UN Observation Posts (OP's) remains manned by UKRBAT personnel, but this is non-operational and remains surrounded by the BSA. The remainder of UKRBAT are in their base in Zepa. The town continues to be shelled but no reports have been received of further BSA gains in territory. There are no reports of DP movement.

ENDALL

MS Mail

DATE-TIME 25 July 95 20:42
 FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Subject: Massacres at Srebrenica ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
 TO Bass, Peter E.
 Cicio, Kristen K.
 Emery, Mary C.
 Hall, Wilma G.
 Veit, Katherine M.
 CARBON_COPY Drew, Samuel N.
 Gardner, Anthony
 Marshall, Betty A.
 Maxfield, Nancy H.
 Peters, Mary A.
 Schmidt, John R.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.



TEXT_BODY

For TL and SRB:

Whatever you think of Galbraith's recommendation re Zepa, the fact of Serb mass killings at Srebrenica is becoming increasingly clear. Grim reading.

 PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:251907Z JUL 95

FM: AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6565


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E.O. 12356: DECL: 07/25/00
 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, BK, HR
 SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MASS EXECUTION OF SREBRENICA
 MALES IS REASON TO SAVE ZEPA

1. A UN OFFICIAL HAS RECOUNTED TO ME AN INTERVIEW SHE CONDUCTED OF A SREBRENICA REFUGEE IN TUZLA. THE ACCOUNT, WHICH SHE FELT WAS HIGHLY CREDIBLE, PROVIDES DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE MASSACRED MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THE 5,000 PLUS

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526



MI 6/6/13
 2012-0800-m

MILITARY AGE MEN IN THEIR CUSTODY FOLLOWING THE FALL OF SREBRENICA.

2. IF THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY MASSACRED THE DEFENDERS OF SREBRENICA, WE CAN BE SURE A SIMILAR FATE AWAITS MANY OF THE 16,000 PEOPLE IN ZEPA. THE LONDON DECLARATION IMPLICITLY WRITES OFF ZEPA. IN VIEW OF THE NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS OF ATROCITIES IN SREBRENICA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR MASSACRE THERE, I URGE RECONSIDERATION OF AIR STRIKES TO HELP ZEPA.

3. THE SREBRENICA REFUGEE IS A 35-YEAR-OLD MAN. HE FLED SREBRENICA AS THE SERBS TOOK OVER, BUT WAS LATER ROUNDED UP IN A FOREST ALONG WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND OTHER REFUGEES. AT LEAST OVERNIGHT HE WAS HELD IN A SMALL BUILDING PACKED WITH MEN. THROUGH THE NIGHT THE SERBS TOOK OUT MEN IN SMALL GROUPS AND THEY WERE NOT SEEN AGAIN. THE REFUGEES WERE TRANSPORTED IN TRUCKS AND BUSES TO A STADIUM, APPARENTLY AT BRATUNAC. ALONG THE WAY, SERBS FIRED INTO THE TRUCKS AND BUSES APPARENTLY KILLING NUMEROUS REFUGEES.

4. AT THE STADIUM, GENERAL MLADIC ADDRESSED THE PRISONERS, TAUNTING THEM THAT "THEIR ALIJA" HAD BEEN UNABLE TO HELP THEM AND THAT THE MUSLIMS OUGHT TO HAVE STAYED IN YUGOSLAVIA. HE THEN ASSURED THE MEN THAT, IF THEY WERE COOPERATIVE, THEY WOULD BE RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES. AT THIS STAGE, THE MEN WERE BOUND WITH HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

5. FROM THE STADIUM, THE MEN WERE TAKEN ON TRUCKS TO KONJEVIC POLJE. THEY WERE TAKEN FROM THE TRUCKS, MADE TO LIE DOWN, AND THEN MACHINE GUNNED. THIS REFUGEE SURVIVED BECAUSE THE BULLET GRAZED HIS TEMPLE, CREATING A VERY BLOODY APPEARANCE BUT DOING LITTLE REAL DAMAGE. AFTER THE SOLDIERS LEFT, HE, AND ANOTHER MAN WHO ALSO SURVIVED, HID IN A DITCH. THE SOLDIERS CAME BACK AND BULLDOZED THE BODIES.

6. ACCORDING TO THE UN SOURCE, THE MAN HAD MARKS ON HIS WRISTS FROM WHERE HIS HANDS HAD BEEN BOUND. HE ALSO HAD WOUNDS ON HIS LEGS AND ARMS FROM WHERE MACHINE GUN BULLETS HAD SPRAYED ROCKS ONTO HIM.

7. THE REFUGEE BELIEVES THAT ALL THE MEN IN THE STADIUM WERE MURDERED IN THIS WAY. (b)(6) (b)(6) WHO ALSO INTERVIEWED SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN TUZLA (PLEASE PROTECT), TOLD ME THAT (b)(6) ALSO BELIEVES THAT THOUSANDS MAY HAVE DIED IN TRANSIT TO KONJEVIC POLJE OR AT THE EXECUTION SITE.

8. IF THIS ACCOUNT IS ACCURATE, THERE MAY BE NO SURVIVORS OF THE MEN ROUNDED UP IN SREBRENICA. WE SHOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO SEE THESE MEN. IF THE SERBS REFUSE ACCESS, THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OBVIOUS.

9. AGAIN, IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO PREVENT A SIMILAR TRAGEDY AT ZEPA. ZEPA'S DEFENDERS VALIANTLY CONTINUE TO HOLD ON. UNDOUBTEDLY THEY REALIZE THE FATE THAT AWAITS THEM. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED.
GALBRAITH

From: Lt Col J R J Baxter
MA to Comd

CONFIDENTIAL



To: See Distribution

Date: 26 July 1995

2/9

MEETING NOTES GENERAL SMITH/GENERAL MLADIC 25 JULY

SUMMARY

1. General Smith met General Mladic at "Restoran Jela" at Han-Kram at 1230 hrs on 25 July 95. The meeting was at our request. Our purpose was to discuss the situation in Zepa and also to follow up on aspects of the Agreement signed between General Smith and General Mladic on 19 July. General Mladic was accompanied by General Gvero.

2. Zepa dominated the meeting, General Mladic arrived carrying an agreement signed by Bosnian officials within the pocket providing for a cease fire, the evacuation from the pocket of all less men of military age and the exchange of those men for Bosnian Serb detainees under UNPROFOR auspices. After a two hour meeting, General Smith decided to move to Zepa and resume the meeting with Mladic in order to assess the situation for himself and to initiate, with Bosnian agreement, the evacuation of the wounded. General Smith spent four hours in Zepa with General Mladic, he met with the local Bosnian officials, ICRC and UNPROFOR officials on the ground. On return to Sarajevo he went directly to the Presidency for a meeting with the President to brief him on the situation and to discuss the implementation of the Agreement. The situation in Zepa is the subject of a separate note; it is clear that events are moving faster than both the Bosnian Government and UNPROFOR are able to manage.

MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED

3. Zepa. This is the subject of a separate note.

4. The London Conference and the Ultimatum delivered to Mladic. General Mladic commented on his meeting in Belgrade with the UK/US and French delegation at which the Gorazde related ultimatum was explained to him. He stated that he had assured Milosovic that he had no intention of attacking Gorazde provided the ABiH did not conduct offensive operations from within the pocket of Gorazde. He added that the Muslims were presently conducting operations in the Treskevica area with the intention of linking up with Gorazde; and that he would find a continuation of this operation intolerable. We concur with the view that Mladic is unconcerned with the ultimatum and we do not believe that it will alter his plans. Interestingly, he was clearly outraged by the delivery of the ultimatum: 'people have no right to tell Serbs how to conduct themselves in their own country, we did not start the war, we do not endanger the countries who delivered the ultimatum, all we require is equal treatment, the lifting of sanctions, and the right to live on our own land'. Mladic clearly believes that the delegation understood his message.

5. Review of The Mladic/Smith Agreement of 19 July 95.

a. Mladic confirmed that he would allow ICRC access to Srebrenica, although we understand this is still to take place.

b. Mladic confirmed his commitment to permit troop-rotation in Gorazde.

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c. Mladic promised to restore Sarajevo's utilities 'if the Muslims stop their offensives'.


d. UNHCR Convoys to Sarajevo. General Smith questioned Mladic on why he had reduced tonnages of UNHCR aid by 50%, effectively producing a 50:50 distribution of aid between the Bosnian Serbs and Sarajevo. Mladic then repeated his threats about UNPROFOR and UNHCR use of the Igman route. He also claimed that UNHCR discriminates against the Bosnian Serbs and repeated the oft heard demand for reciprocity. General Smith explained that he did not 'seek a fight' by using the Igman route. He explained that the Kiseljak to Sarajevo route was now the priority route for all UN agencies. He made the point, however, that Sector Sarajevo needs to use the Igman route for liaison visits etc. to FREBAT 5. During the course of this exchange, Mladic agreed to approve the full UNHCR request for next week. He also undertook to examine the possibility of Sector Sarajevo using Krupac route onto Igman. On the issue of reciprocity in the delivery of aid, General Smith offered to arrange a meeting between Mladic and UNHCR Head of Mission as well as with Professor Koljevic in order to clarify the UNHCR position. This was accepted.

6. Bihac. General Smith raised the matter of the dangerous and volatile situation in Bihac with General Mladic. Mladic expressed little interest in discussing Bihac. He claimed that the heart of the Bihac problem was a battle between Muslims. He denied active ARSK involvement in Bihac claiming that assistance was limited to the provision of arms and ammunition. He offered few constructive suggestions for Bihac but demanded that the Croats stop 'massing and withdrawal' and for a meeting between General Dudadovic and Abdic, which he would sponsor with the precondition that 5 Corps withdraw to the 23 December 94 Confrontation Line. Mladic clearly recognises the danger of the Balkan conflict escalating by a Croatian offensive.

7. Misc Mladic Proposals.

a. Mladic announced that he had met a high ranking Russian delegation the previous evening and claimed that he had asked them to start peace initiatives with UK, USA and France. His aspiration, which we have heard before is for a military and political meeting in a neutral country.

b. Bihac and Gorazde. Buoyed by his apparent success in negotiations with the Bosnian Authorities in Zepa, Mladic made a proposal for General Smith to broker secret meetings with the Gorazde and Bihac authorities to work towards the demilitarization of these areas.


J R J Baxter
Lt Col
MA to Comd

Distribution:

HQ UNPF Zagreb for SRSG, FC, DFC

Internal:

COS, CAC, PINFO



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4-19

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(X161)

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

'95 AUG -4 P7:55

[REDACTED]
DECL: 8/4/2000

TO: The Secretary
FROM: DRL - John Shattuck *JS*
SUBJECT: Bosnia Trip Report

SUMMARY

I have just completed a two-day mission to central and northeastern Bosnia. My focus was on events that occurred when the Bosnian Serb army attacked and took control of two UN safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa. My main conclusion is that atrocities have taken place on a massive scale, and that hundreds if not thousands of unarmed refugees were killed at the time the safe havens were overrun, many by mass executions.

Some 13,000 former residents of these safe areas are still missing. An undetermined number of those are being detained by the Bosnian Serb military; others are likely to be still at large in the hills and woods around the two towns. I will be seeking 7th floor approval for a plan to mobilize international support to induce Pale to agree to provide a full and accurate accounting of the fate of all residents of those safe areas; to permit access to them by international representatives; and, to guarantee their protection and, in the case of non-combatants, evacuation.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of my mission was to ascertain the dimensions, the specific kinds and the categories of crimes that were committed in both cases. I travelled to Tuzla and Zenica, returning via Geneva. After interviewing a dozen refugees and meeting with representatives of various agencies, including UNHCR and ICRC, as well as investigators of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, my conclusions/observations are as follows:

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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
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 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

-- A very large number of people who were in Srebrenica and Zepa when they were seized are missing and unaccounted for. For Srebrenica, credible estimates cluster around 10,000, for Zepa, around 3,000; both figures include women and children, although most are men and boys.

-- I received credible eyewitness accounts of mass executions of men and boys by Bosnian Serb soldiers with many of the victims buried in mass graves dug on the spot by bulldozers. There were also first-hand accounts of brutalities committed against people who were trying to flee, including the use of chemical agents.

-- Survivors recounted how unarmed men and boys, including disabled, were rounded up and held in gymnasiums and other enclosed places where some were beaten and in some cases executed.

-- I was given information about rapes and other sexual abuse of women.

-- I also heard several accounts of Bosnian Serb soldiers luring residents to follow them by wearing UN helmets and uniforms and then attacking them.

-- Many refugees stated that General Mladic was highly visible throughout this time in Srebrenica and Zepa, and one eyewitness claimed he was present at a mass execution.

-- Finally, I received information about the existence of Bosnian serb detention centers or concentration camps.

These accounts appear to constitute substantial new evidence of genocide and crimes against humanity in eastern Bosnia; this evidence is now being investigated by the War Crimes Tribunal. If this evidence is substantiated, it will and should lead to further indictments of Bosnian Serb authorities. Chief Prosecutor Goldstone's investigators are in the field gathering information that could likely be used toward that end. We are seeking to send personnel to assist.

I am offering elsewhere recommendations for urgent action. They include demarches by the U.S., other governments, and the UN with the Serb and Bosnian Serb authorities. Their purpose would be to gain access to and protection for those who are still alive in both former safe areas, and to insist on cooperation in a full accounting of all former residents. We need also to draw immediate lessons from the fall of these two enclaves: preventative measures can save lives in Bihac and Gorazde. Therefore, we should urge; facilitate and seek to ensure a continued substantial presence of UNPROFOR, along with other international organizations such as ICRC and UNHCR in Gorazde and Bihac. That would offer some hope that the magnitude and horror of the human rights abuses of Srebrenica and Zepa will not be repeated.

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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 AMEMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003086

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCLANT FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER PENNER, VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O.12356: DECL: 08/10/05
 TAGS: PREL, UNSC, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
 SUBJECT: CROATIA, BOSNIA: AMB ALBRIGHT BRIEFS SECURITY
 COUNCIL ON POSSIBLE MASS GRAVES NEAR SREBRENICA;
 GHAREKHAN BRIEFS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA
 DURING SC INFORMALS

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. SUMMARY. DURING INFORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL
 CONSULTATIONS ON AUGUST 10 AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT GAVE A
 PRESENTATION ON THE FATE OF SOME BOSNIAN REFUGEES FROM
 NEAR SREBRENICA. USYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON
 THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA. MEMBERS
 DISCUSSED THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON CROATIA AND
 SREBRENICA. END SUMMARY.

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AMB ALBRIGHT'S PRESENTATION ON SREBRENICA REFUGEES

3. AMB ALBRIGHT GAVE A PRESENTATION TO COUNCIL MEMBERS
 DURING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON AUGUST 10 ON THE FATE
 OF SOME BOSNIAN REFUGEES FROM NEAR SREBRENICA DETAINED
 BY THE BSA. DRAWING ON INFORMATION GATHERED BY U.S.
 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY ASSISTANT
 SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN SHATTUCK, AND AERIAL

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PHOTOGRAPHS, SHE DESCRIBED TWO INCIDENTS INVOLVING REFUGEES FROM SREBRENICA.

4. THE FIRST INCIDENT TOOK PLACE IN NOVA KASABA, A TOWN NORTH OF BRATUNAC. A BOSNIAN REFUGEE TOLD SHATTUCK HOW HE AND OTHERS WERE BROUGHT TO A FIELD WHERE THEY WERE LINED UP IN GROUPS OF 20-25 AND MACHINE-GUNNED. THE REFUGEE SURVIVED BY FALLING UNDER OTHER BODIES AND LATER ESCAPING. PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BEFOREHAND SHOW THE PRISONERS NEARBY AND THE EARTH UNDISTURBED. SUBSEQUENT PHOTOS SHOW EVIDENCE OF THE DIGGING OF MASS GRAVES.

5. IN A SECOND INCIDENT, A TEENAGE BOY TOLD OF JOINING A GROUP OF REFUGEES NEAR POCARI. ON JULY 12 OR 13, AFTER BEING SEPARATED FROM THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, AT LEAST 400 MEN WERE FORCED ONTO TRUCKS AND TAKEN INTO A SCHOOL NEAR BRATUNAC. A PHOTOGRAPH SHOWS A GROUP OF PRISONERS IN THE RIGHT LOCATION AT THE RIGHT TIME. SMALL GROUPS WERE TAKEN OUTSIDE AND THE REFUGEE HEARD SHOTS. THE BOY WAS TAKEN BY TRUCK TO A FIELD, LITTERED

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

PAGE 04 USUN N 03086 01 OF 02 110154Z
WITH CORPSES, AND WAS SHOT THREE TIMES. BY FEIGNING DEATH, HE AVOIDED DETECTION BY SERB SOLDIERS AND LATER ESCAPED TO GOVERNMENT TERRITORY.

6. COUNCIL MEMBERS AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL MUST CONDEMN SUCH ACTS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS. MEMBERS AGREED TO ADOPT THE RESOLUTIONS ON CROATIA AND BOSNIA IN A FORMAL MEETING THAT AFTERNOON. (SEPTTEL).

GHAREKHAN BRIEFING

7. USYG GHAREKHAN TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LOCAL CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE CROATIAN ARMY (HV) AND THE KRAJINA SERBS (ARSK) CONTINUED TO BE THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION AND ACTIVITY IN CROATIA. THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR ALL RSK HEAVY WEAPONS TO BE HANDED OVER AT TWO UNCRO WEAPONS COLLECTIONS POINTS. IN SECTOR NORTH

Images from U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency - Source: ICTY





[Excerpt from original article]

Evidence Indicates Bosnia Massacre

Eyewitness report supports charges by US of killings

By David Rohde, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor August 18, 1995

NOVA KASABA, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA — AN on-the-spot investigation by The Christian Science Monitor has uncovered strong evidence that a massacre of Bosnian Muslim prisoners took place last month.

A Monitor reporter, traveling without the permission of rebel Bosnian Serbs, looked into charges by American officials that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Muslims were killed by the Serbs after they overran two UN-protected "safe areas."

The Serbs deny the US charges, which were based on spy-satellite photos.

The visit by this reporter was the first by a Western journalist to the sites of the alleged atrocities near the former safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. The physical evidence was grim and convincing:

*At one site shown in the spy photos this reporter saw what appeared to be a decomposing human leg protruding from the freshly turned dirt.

*Large, empty ammunition boxes littered the open fields where the ground recently had been dug.

*Diplomas, photos, and other personal effects of Srebrenica Muslims were scattered near the areas of disturbed earth.

*At a soccer stadium in a nearby town, human feces, blood, and other evidence indicated large numbers of persons were confined, and perhaps shot.

[...]

US officials first made public charges about alleged atrocities by Bosnian Serbs in this area on Aug. 10. In a closed session of the UN Security Council, US ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright said that as many as 2,700 Bosnian Muslims might have been hastily executed and buried in shallow graves.

In a dramatic presentation of evidence, Ms. Albright displayed spy plane and satellite photos of an area in the small farming village of Nova Kasaba, about 14 miles west of Srebrenica. "Before" photos showed prisoners crowded into a soccer field and undisturbed earth in an empty field a half mile away. "After" photos from a few days later show no prisoners and three areas of disturbed earth in outlying fields that resemble mass graves.

In addition, US officials cited the account of an elderly Muslim refugee, who said that he had been one of 600 men held at the Nova Kasaba soccer field. Bosnian Serb soldiers trucked the Muslim men in groups of 20 to a nearby field and machine gunned them, said the refugee, who escaped when he was left for dead among the corpses. The bodies of hundreds of men were then bulldozed into mass graves, according to the refugee's account.

During a reporter's visit to the site this Wednesday, three areas of fresh digging were clearly visible. On the edge of the smallest of the three alleged mass graves, what appeared to be a human femur and tibia surrounded by bits of tattered fabric jutted from rich brown dirt.

One hundred yards from the second-largest grave, handwritten notes from a March 14, 1995, local government meeting in the village of Potocari, located inside the former UN "safe area" of Srebrenica, were found. Twenty feet from the same grave, a 1982 elementary school diploma and what appeared to be washed-out personal photographs of a Muslim youth from the village of Kravice, also near Srebrenica, were found. [...]

4-26

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How a Serb Massacre Was Exposed

Monitor reporter eluded soldiers and discovered evidence of Serb atrocities

By David Rohde, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor August 25, 1995

BELGRADE — An Aug. 18 Monitor article revealed the first on-the-ground details of a massacre of perhaps thousands of Bosnian Muslims in July after Bosnian Serb forces took the UN "safe havens" of Srebrenica and Zepa. The reporter's account confirmed US charges of a massacre based on spy satellite photos. In the following report, the correspondent tells how he got the story.

NEARING the Serb-held village of Nova Kasaba in Bosnia, I stared at a blurry, faxed copy of a US spy satellite photo. Were there really mass graves in the fields near this road, as US officials alleged from the photo?

Another photo, taken earlier, reportedly showed a soccer field half mile away where Muslim prisoners had been held, just before the alleged graves showed up in the later photos.

I had reached this spot somewhat by happenstance. I was allowed to enter Bosnian Serb territory, but only to travel to Pale and Banja Luka to cover Serbian refugees who had fled Croatia.

Because Serb officials somehow failed to provide me with a military escort and gave me wrong directions, I ended up on the road to the towns of Nova Kasaba and Bratunac. Suddenly, I realized I was near the area shown in the photos.

The soccer field, now filled with grazing cows and horses, rolled by on my right. Bosnian Serb soldiers at a military command post eyed my car warily. I turned back and parked my car on a dirt road where it could not be seen. I left my Serb driver and interpreter in the car.

But something seemed wrong. The Jadran River snaked through the valley of fields and bombed-out houses where the alleged mass graves should be.

But the photo showed no river. Convinced I was in the wrong place, I walked toward the soccer field. As cars passed by, I spotted a 10-foot-by-20-foot hole just off the road. It was empty, but a piece of paper filled with scribbled Muslim names lay in the grass nearby.

A series of Muslim names, the date of March 15, 1995, and the name "Potocari" - a village located inside Srebrenica - were legible. I put it in my pocket.

Cars and trucks, some carrying soldiers, whizzed by as I walked the half mile to the soccer field. Three villagers shepherding cows were greeted with hellos and good mornings. They looked at me strangely, but moved on. In the soft early morning light, surrounded by peaceful green fields and wildflowers, massacres seemed impossible.

The soccer field, where two survivors of the alleged massacre say that Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic gave a speech promising the prisoners they would not be harmed, contained nothing but grazing cows and horses. I spent a half hour crisscrossing the field, but found only one pair of abandoned sneakers.

The search: Discouraged and nervous, I headed back toward the car.

The number of villagers on the road was slowly increasing. I saw faint truck tracks heading through a field toward the river, but three to four villagers were walking in the area. A truck pulled up and stopped directly

[Full original article, reformatted]

in front of me. The door opened, and an elderly couple, to my relief, got out. We greeted each other, and I moved on.

Seeing another set of faint truck tracks, I followed them. They dead-ended at the river, and appeared to be used by a truck harvesting corn from the surrounding fields. As I headed back to the road, a half-dozen Bosnian Serb soldiers riding in a horse-drawn cart passed by. They stared intently at me and started speaking to each other.

I turned my back and pretended to go to the bathroom. Slowly, the sound of the horse's hoofs disappeared into the distance.

Ignoring land mines: I walked back to where I had found the paper and noticed another faint set of truck tracks leading toward the river. Ignoring the possibility of land mines, I followed the tracks down a slight slope to the river.

A large empty green ammunition box, which appeared relatively new, sat about 50 feet off the road, and a second empty box was found later nearer the road. Closer to the river, a 200 foot-by -200 foot area recently had been dug up. A smooth, earthen ramp leading into the water had recently been bulldozed. Another earthen ramp and fresh truck tracks led up the opposite bank.

The graves must be on the other side of the river, I thought. But the 100-foot-wide river appeared too deep to wade through. I turned back and noticed some papers in the grass.

It was a primary school diploma that had been awarded to a Muslim boy in a village near Srebrenica in 1982. And photos, rendered unrecognizable by rain, were also scattered in the grass. Muslim names were written on the back.

I stuck the diploma in my pocket and crisscrossed the area of fresh dirt. I saw nothing but grass that had begun to spring from some parts of the rich brown soil. A shot rang out from a nearby hill, and I froze. I waited, heard nothing more, then hurried back up to the main road.

Convinced the mass graves were on the other side of the river, I walked away from the center of the village hoping to find a bridge. Traffic had increased, and some men cut hay on a hillside

Piles of fresh dirt: About a mile up the road, I crossed over a bridge and followed a dirt track back toward the earthen truck crossing. About a mile farther, two 25-foot-high piles of fresh dirt had been dumped near a stream.

The dirt track narrowed, and I crossed into a field. Shots rang out again from a nearby hill and whizzed overhead. I froze. Crouching in the wide open field, I decided to walk slowly. If I ran, I could be mistaken for one of the hundreds of Muslim men from Srebrenica that Bosnian Serb soldiers said were still hiding in the area. The Muslims were being shot on sight, they said.

As I neared the truck crossing, despair began to set in. I saw no indication of digging in any of the fields; only a relatively new pitch fork lay in my path.

More shots. The sound of a truck passing and men shouting came from the road. A machine gun fired, but this time farther away. Another burst. I realized a group of Bosnian Serb soldiers were driving by celebrating by shooting their guns in the air.

4-28

[Full original article, reformatted]

I crossed another field. Nothing. I reached the truck crossing. Nothing. I looked through two abandoned houses. Nothing. Truck tracks crossed the fields, but I thought it was probably hay harvesters. I again looked at the blurry fax of the satellite photo. Again, no river.

Dejected and nervous, I turned back, amazed and embarrassed that I was unable to find the alleged graves. I had ventured into the surrounding fields and spent two hours in the area, something I swore I would not do.

I started back across the field. Three to four shots rang out from hills to my left. Two shots were fired back from my right. I panicked and crouched. Move or stay still. Run or walk. I waited. Silence.

Pitchfork gone: Slowly, I rose and walked across the open field. The right side of my face tingled. No shots. Nothing. But as I retraced my steps, the pitchfork was gone.

I reached the dirt path and saw what looked like some clothes in the distance. The clothes, and empty cloth bag, some papers, a bullet, and Muslim prayer beads lay scattered across the grass. Dozens of the papers had "Srebrenica" stamped on them. I grabbed the prayer beads, bullet, and papers and headed back to the car. Along the path I briefly saw the silhouette of a man on a nearby footpath. No shots rang out

Bones discovered: Back at the car, I headed down the steep embankment to check the small field next to the river where earlier I had spotted an area of fresh digging. I finally realized that if the satellite photo only covered a few hundred square yards, then it was possible the river was just outside the frame of the picture.

I walked toward the dirt. To my left, something white jutted from a 20 foot by 20 foot plot of freshly dug earth. Two long, thin bones, one the size and shape of a human femur, the other of a human tibia, stared up at me.

Pictures from friends' medical books and X-rays of my own once-broken femur raced through my mind. I later visited the Belgrade University veterinarian school, staring at the femurs and tibias of cows, horses, pigs, bears, dogs, deer, and other animals. What I saw was too long, too thin for an animal. Traces of blue cloth surrounded the femur as it entered the ground.

Fresh dig: I turned and crisscrossed the larger area of fresh digging and found nothing. A car passed by. I again stared at the bone. Animals and insects appeared to have eaten away all the flesh. When I heard no cars, I scrambled up the embankment.

With one last field to check, I walked nervously down the main road. A truck rounded the corner. A dozen Bosnian Serb soldiers, armed with assault rifles, stood in the back. An area of fresh digging was clearly visible a few hundred yards to my right. The truck sped toward me.

Soldiers watch: I waved. The soldiers stared. The truck slowed, and I stopped breathing. After what seemed an eternity, the driver - apparently slowing for the turn in the road - hit the accelerator and sped off.

I checked the last field, looked at the bones one last time, picked up some shell casings from the side of the road, and got in the car.

As I sped north toward the border, despair washed over me. He must have been tall, I thought, and he must have died horribly.

It was a diploma awarded to a Muslim boy in a village near Srebrenica. And photos, with Muslim names on the backs, were scattered in the grass.

Extracts from Diary of US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith
July 1995 – September 1995
Source: National Defense University

July 20

Back from Washington, and Vermont. It has been a disastrous and demeaning two weeks in which the Bosnian Serbs took over the Srebrenica safe area, and have attacked the Zepa safe area which appears to have fallen, or to be on the verge of falling. The Bosnian Serbs have been true to form in Srebrenica, and the papers are full of accounts completely reminiscent of 1992: civilians massacred along the roadside, young girls taken off of buses, raped, killed and their naked bodies discarded like human rubbish, men and boys rounded up for camps. Of Srebrenica's 40,000, some 10,000 are still missing.

In Washington, I tried to buck people up, and perhaps to shame them into action. I saw the Secretary to complain about the Milosevic option, noting his continued support of the Bosnian Serb military. This includes running an integrated air defense system that shot down an American plane, paying salaries of Bosnian Serb officers, the VJ maintaining Bosnian Serb military vehicles in Serbia, and the rounding up of conscripts for the BSA. Also, given the close consultation between Milosevic and Mladic (Mladic was present during Milosevic's marathon meeting with Bildt) it is inconceivable that Milosevic did not know and, at least tacitly bless, the Srebrenica-Zepa operations. I also urged our Security Council legal proposal to aid the Bosnians by providing money so they can buy weapons. The Secretary was clearly briefed on my views, but listened carefully. He indicated that it may come to a covert program and that I had a point on Milosevic. I did not however get the impression that he was going to change our Milosevic diplomatic track just now. And, indeed, Frasure seems to be going along with a new Bildt mechanism on reimposition of sanctions.

I also strongly urged Donalin and Holbrooke not to write off Zepa. A public statement that we are drawing the line at Goradze could have disastrous consequences for the 16,000 people at Zepa. After Srebrenica, they may find it preferable to fight to the death and we shouldn't worsen their situation.

[...]

July 21

Saw Akashi to deliver a tough demarche that all UN personnel should be withdrawn from places where they might be hostages. He spoke of the UN's dual role and of the continued importance of monitoring and reporting. I pointed out this only created potential hostages, and would be a barrier to effective action. He still doesn't get it. The demarche incidentally includes words of warning that the Bosnian Serb leadership will be held personally responsible for the fate of the hostages. This is language I like to hear.

[...]

July 22

I dictated a hasty cable describing last night's dinner with the headline "Tudjman decides for direct military intervention to save Bihac, says Susak." In it I said we had two credible options for handling the situation. These were:

-- Do nothing. The fall of Bihac would create 160,000 new refugees, and strike a further blow at the credibility of the United Nations effort. If the international community won't save Bihac, would it not be better to have the Croatsians save it than the Serbs take it?

-- Promise the Croatsians that if they exercise restraint, the U.S. will oppose any further sanctions relief on Serbia until it recognizes Croatia. Last November 13, we were able to head off a similar Croatian decision by assuring Tudjman that we would use all leverage on Serbia, including the maintenance of sanctions, to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Krajina situation. With our Milosevic track, we have nothing to offer Croatia in terms of pressure for the peaceful recovery of its territory. Hence, the Croatian decision to recover the Krajina militarily. Since the fall of Bihac would make that action more difficult, the current Serb attacks are accelerating the Croatian timetable.

[...]

July 24

War appears imminent. The Croatsians plan to move tomorrow at 4:00 a.m. on Bosanska Grahovo. The Serbs have artillery in Sector South and plan to retaliate by shelling Croatian coastal cities. The Croatian plan would then be to take a sharp left at Grahovo and move onto Knin. They would punch a corridor through Slunj to Bihac. In the north they plan to move on Kostionica. They would also take Petrinja, and the territory around Virinmost, Topusko, and Glina, so as to put Zagreb out of artillery range. Cervenko has told me much of their war plans and so has Susak.

Unlike November 13, 1994, we will not tell the Croatians not to do it. Holbrooke bought my arguments and says he advanced them with the White House. They met on the issue Saturday and today. Tarnoff wants to send a demarche warning the Croatians of the dangers, as if they hadn't thought of them themselves. In a war is imminent cable, I said I had warned the Croatians of the dangers so as to head off such silliness.

July 25

[...]

I received a demarche on Bihac. It is actually rather good. It expresses understanding of the Croatian position ("with the Serbs attacking the Bihac enclave from Croatian territory, and the Sarajevo requesting your assistance, we cannot dispute your right to intervene military to repel the Serbs"), but goes on to warn the Croatians against human rights abuses of the Serb population, mistreatment of POWs, and so on. It does call for limiting the Bihac operation and not making it the general attack on the UNPAS, but this is of course not how it will develop.

I am instructed to deliver the demarche to the highest available GOC official. However, Tudjman, Granic, Susak, and Sarinic are out of town. I give it to Zuzul at lunch. Actually he is the best interlocutor as he understands its significance. As long as Croatia behaves well in the conduct of its operations, we will not support any punitive action. Now Croatia has no reason not to move directly through Krajina

to save Bihac. The demarche includes an extraordinary line "we appreciate the close consultation with your government in the past week, as well as your willingness to expend blood and treasure to help defend the Bosnians." Zuzul said he would pass the talking points on to Tudjman and asked if they could be made public (I urged not).

More broadly Zuzul described the situation in Bihac as a race against time. He estimated it would take 10 days for the operation in Bosnia to reach Bihac. However, Bihac might not be able to last so long. If so, Croatia would have to go directly. He said things would be clearer by the weekend. Zuzul emphasized that Bihac was critical to Croatia, now more important than even Knin.

I spoke to Weisel and described our demarche. He liked it very much and tracked what he would recommend for the German government.

Tone heard an extraordinary story from a man from Srebrenica whom she had interviewed in Tuzla. He had been captured by the Serbs in the woods, mistreated in transit, taken to a stadium (apparently Bratunac) where Mladic had taunted some 4,000 prisoners ("your Alija can't help you;" ... "the Muslims should never have left Yugoslavia"), and then he was transported on a packed truck to Konjevic Polje where the group was machine gunned. This refugee escaped when the bullet grazed his temple creating much blood but doing little damage. He and another survivor hid in a ditch as the Serbs bulldozed the bodies. He estimated 150 were killed in his group but the implication is that all 5,000 military aged males who were captured with the fall of Srebrenica had been executed. I sent a NODIS describing the story and strongly urging reconsideration of our decision to write off Zepa. However, later I learned that Zepa town had already fallen.

[...]

July 27

[...]

I had a long talk with Holbrooke, who assessed my view as a reluctant belief that Croatian entry into the war is better than the continuation of the status quo. I insisted my view is that, if the UN won't save Bihac, then it is better for Croatia to save it and the 160,000 people who live there than to have them ethnically cleansed by the Serbs. In short, in the hierarchy of evils, the fall of Bihac is a greater one than a wider war. It seems my view has prevailed, and largely because I have pushed hard and written persuasively. The Croatians are much more likely to act because we have not given them a red light. I have emphasized the parts of our message that reflect understanding of the Croatian position, while emphasizing over and over the importance of protecting human rights and UN peacekeepers. I hope this is the right course of action. I feel responsibility for the consequences.

[...]

I spoke to Chris Hoh after the dinner who said the Deputies Committee, which met on my cable, want to do one more demarche asking the Croats to wait for NATO. I asked sarcastically if NATO planned to do anything. The DC is a pathetic group that thinks it controls policy, but because its recommendations are so weak (do a memo, send a demarche) it really controls nothing. I speak to Chris Hill secure, and he says the demarche would just be a repeat of what we received earlier this week. In any event no demarche ever arrived.

[...]

July 29

[...]

I received a demarche instruction to see Tudjman or the highest available GOC official to press our point that Croatia should withhold on military action. This represented a slight change from our earlier position that any Croatian action should be limited. This was the product of Friday's Deputies' Committee meeting. As Chris Hill explained to me, in the absence of a policy, the DC wants to (1) have a meeting, (2) have a report, or (3) send a cable. Since they were already meeting on a report, the only course of action is to send a cable.

Some of the points were a bit silly. The Croats have obviously already assessed the risks of FRY intervention and their prospects for success "in the mountainous area of Krajina." On the other hand, the message usefully calls for more time to see if anything can be negotiated, and doesn't change our basic position that "these are Zagreb's decisions to make."

[...]

July 30

Shattuck came to town. He is making the trip solely to investigate the Srebrenica disappeared and it is directly a response to my cable recounting Tone's interview in Tuzla. Tone gave him the story in detail and how to contact the witness. His aide, Josiah Rosenblatt, referred at lunch to the August 1 date even though some of the Embassy staff there don't know it nor does Tone. It is outrageous that a secret can be so widely disseminated and that even professionals don't keep it.

[...]

August 1

[...]

At the press conference Shattuck outlines his findings. He has talked to two survivors of the killings, as well as other victims of Serb atrocities. He says he heard first hand reports of mass executions, robberies, rapes, and harrassment. Unfortunately, he misses the real point of what he heard. That there may have been the systematic killing of between eight and twelve thousand Srebrenica disappeared. I jump in to make this point, and in a later brief to the NYT, LATimes, and W Post ask the question "where are the missing?" Shattuck could have gotten more attention, although eventually he makes CNN.

[...]

August 3

War will begin at 4:30 tomorrow. I saw Tudjman at 5:45 P.M. with our final demarche. I described what Babic had agreed to, and pointed out that Croatia had achieved everything

it sought. I emphasized that Babic had agreed to negotiate for a political settlement within Croatia, and that he understood he could not get as much as the Z-4 Plan.

I had received demarche instructions this morning, ostensibly in support of my agreement with Babic yesterday. In fact the instructions were incredibly weak and seemed to indicate we were only going through the motions. For example, they conceded a key Croatian point when they said "we understand that Knin's intentions must be measured by actions not words." The punch line was an underwhelming "we urge you to evaluate the serb reaction carefully and to explore fully the possible opening for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict."

I called Frasure to say that this was guaranteed to undermine what we had achieved in Belgrade. He was busy getting ready for a Bildt meeting. When he got back to me he said the Deputies Committee would take up the war in Croatia at 5:00. This is guaranteed to produce nothing and my meeting was at 5:45.

I called Tarnoff, now the Acting Secretary. I said a war in Croatia would be a terrible human tragedy involving thousands of dead and more than 100,000 refugees. It would produce an ethnically pure Croatia and undermine the hope for multi ethnicity in the Balkans. The people in Krajina should not be punished to this extent for their bad leaders.

[...]

August 5

The Croatians have made great advances, taking Knin this morning. I saw Granic at 6:00 who outlined his strategic view.

[...]

The Deputies Committee has decided I should not help. They want to reduce the perception of a U.S. green light. This is almost obscene. They grant a green light and then don't wish me, who has unique credibility with both sides, to try and stop the killing. Meanwhile tens of thousands of people are leaving their homes.

I talk to Frasure, Holbrooke, and Tarnoff to try to get this decision reversed. Holbrooke is sympathetic but in the end I get a NIACT instructing me not to get involved.

[...]

August 7

The day began with a call from Frasure which was something of an apology for my treatment over the past few days. He explained that he and Holbrooke had wanted a war because "it represented a fundamental reshuffle of the deck." They had not wanted me involved in the ceasefire because it might exacerbate the impression of a U.S. green light with the allies. I am glad all of this is on his conscience.

[...]

August 16

The Holbrooke delegation and I called on Tudjman to present the plan at a noon meeting followed by lunch. Tudjman was accompanied by Sarinic, Granic, Susak, Zuzul, and Foreign Policy Advisor Matic. Tudjman listened carefully as Holbrooke went through his points.

He then turned in the most astounding performance I have heard from him. While agreeing with the American plan, he then completely trashed the Muslims, the Federation, and the idea of a continuing Bosnian state. He trotted out his familiar tirade that Croatia represents the edge of western civilization, that the Bosnian Muslims are Islamicists at heart seeking a Muslim state from the Adriatic through Sandjak to Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia ("a state even more powerful than Serbia"), and that Croatia was doing the West a favor with its civilizing mission with regard to the Bosnian Muslims.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said, might continue as an internationally recognized state "for the time being." Later he said in English "Bosnia Herzegovina has no future." Tadjman went on to talk about trading Tuzla for Banja Luka, in short his menu map from the May 10 dinner in London.

I found particularly galling Tadjman's blithe assumption that we share his prejudices and prescriptions. I passed Holbrooke a note pointing out "these are all Tadjman's old prejudices, fully re-emerged after 18 months of relative abeyance. Tadjman needs to be responded to very harshly. It was the justification for the Croat-Muslim war. I always used to tell him that Americans were most sympathetic to

the Muslims precisely because we saw them as the most western of Bosnia's three peoples." Holbrooke replied "I agree -- but not now, NOT HERE, NOT YET, beyond what we already said, this is far too serious, if he proceeds on it, to deal with now.

I sent Frasure a note saying "congratulations. Here is your fundamental reshuffle of the deck." To which he replied with characteristic humor "I'm quite sure Tadjman just came to these conclusions in the last couple of weeks of his long and interesting life!"

[...]

Amb Galbraith note to
Holbrooke 11/16, 1995
meeting

Dick -
These are all Tudyman's
old prejudices, fully reemerged
after 18 months of relative abeyance.
This line needs to be responded to
very harshly. It was the justification
for the Croat-Muslim War. I always
used to tell him that Americans
were most sympathetic to
the Muslims precisely because
we saw them as the most
Western of Bosnia's 3 peoples.

Peter.

Peter - I agree - but NOT NOW, NOT HERE, NOT YET
beyond what we already said. This is
1/2 the case. I - it's a bit more

September 17

Holbrooke arrives at 8:10. We meet on the plane. He says his most important message is to tell the Croats not to attack Banja Luka, and asks my opinion. I point out the advantages of regaining Muslim-interest territory in Prijedor, and he says that Washington has finally seen the policy error it had made in counselling restraint on such cases (a policy Holbrooke supported, but I don't say this). On Banja Luka, I point out the advantage of taking the high ground (Manjaca) above the city. This would put Banja Luka, B-H's most important Serb city, in a position analogous to Sarajevo. Deals would be possible to give both cities some hinterland. Holbrooke angrily accuses me of trying to micromanage the military operations, which I deny since I am just offering my assessment. Later, when Clark mentions Manjaca, Holbrooke softpedals pointing to the history of it. I think he sees my point.

In the car we discuss Eastern Slavonia. Holbrooke feels that Milosevic's proposal represents a basis for negotiation. It is obvious Holbrooke knows little about the issue and has not read my cable explaining how far we have gotten. He wants to know whether the Croats can be persuaded to accept some kind of referendum which might even specify that the question is on great autonomy in Croatia. I say no referendum will work.

We see Tudjman at 9:00. Holbrooke gives him an account of the Sarajevo negotiations, and the screwup on heavy weapons language. He then warns on Banja Luka and Tudjman says he agrees. Holbrooke informs Tudjman that Mladic is in the hospital, and there is a look of pure delight on Tudjman's face.

New Proof Offered Of Serb Atrocities

U.S. Analysts Identify More Mass Graves

By Michael Dobbs
and R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States government has supplied international war crimes investigators with reconnaissance photos and other intelligence evidence of "approximately half a dozen" mass grave sites—in addition to those it has previously disclosed—where Bosnian Serb forces buried thousands of Muslims massacred last July.

U.S. officials said yesterday this new evidence supports the accounts of Bosnian Muslims and human rights groups who have described large-scale atrocities by the Serbs after they captured the United Nations "safe area" of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia on July 11.

The United States was first alerted to the possibility of mass killings in the area only a day or two after Srebrenica fell, in a phone call from Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohamed Sacirbey to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright, according to a Washington

Post reconstruction of the U.S. government's response to one of the worst atrocities committed in Europe since World War II.

Although the Clinton administration was quick to denounce the reported "brutal" and "inhumane" behavior by the Bosnian Serbs, it did not go public with detailed evidence of the atrocities until nearly four weeks later. Albright went before the U.N. Security Council in a private session on Aug. 10 to present spy photographs of suspected mass graves and to accuse the Bosnian Serbs of executing many Muslim refugees.

Officials blamed the delay in presenting intelligence evidence on the difficulties of sifting through a vast pile of reconnaissance photos to find corroborating evidence of atrocities. Since then, the administration has been hesitant to release data about the additional mass graves because of fears that the Bosnian Serb authorities might attempt to tamper with the sites to conceal the evidence, officials said. But they said

See MASSACRE, A36, Col 1

U.S. Gives Investigators New Evidence

MASSACRE, From A1

the United States has supplied all relevant information to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Other findings of the reconstruction of events include:

- Western governments felt unable to respond militarily, before the assault, to a Bosnian Serb buildup around Srebrenica, because they feared for the safety of several hundred Dutch peacekeepers in the enclave. Classified American diplomatic cables show that Dutch Defense Minister Joris Voorhoeve repeatedly depicted the situation in the enclave as "hopeless" and opposed the use of NATO air power, despite requests by the local Dutch commander for deterrent strikes.

- U.S. intelligence officials say they have information indicating that regular units of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army crossed into Bosnia and were involved in the assault on Srebrenica, together with Bosnian Serb forces that ostensibly are independent of Belgrade. This disclosure adds credibility to earlier accounts from some journalists and U.N. officials that Yugoslavia aided its Bosnian Serb allies in the military attack on Srebrenica, although not necessarily in the atrocities that followed.

Republican congressional leaders have attacked the Clinton administration's strategy of negotiating with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who has exceptionally close ties to the Yugoslav army, on grounds that Milosevic may be linked to atrocities. Milosevic has repeatedly denied that Yugoslav units are operating in Bosnia.

The latest disclosures come three days before the opening of peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, which will be attended by Milosevic and the lead-

ers of Bosnia and Croatia. Bosnian Serb representatives will attend the talks, as part of a joint Serb delegation headed by Milosevic, who is widely regarded as the political mastermind behind the drive for a "Greater Serbia" that triggered the 3½-year-old Bosnian civil war.

The chief U.S. negotiator to the former Yugoslavia, Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke, who will preside over the Dayton talks, described the Srebrenica atrocities in an interview as "a war crime of major proportions." He depicted the fall of Srebrenica as a "historic event" that galvanized Western governments into taking action to prevent further territorial gains by the Bosnian Serbs and to work to negotiate an end to the war.

As previously reported, the massacres occurred when 12,000 Muslim males of military age, most of them unarmed, sought to trek about 60 miles from Srebrenica to Muslim-controlled territory. Fewer than half completed the trip safely, and nearly all of the others were butchered by Bosnian Serb troops, according to accounts from witnesses and human rights groups. The Red Cross estimates that 8,000 of the men remain missing, while the Bosnian government says at least 10,000 were killed.

In a rare departure from the secrecy that normally surrounds an ongoing intelligence-gathering operation, senior U.S. officials and intelligence analysts agreed to discuss their own investigation into the fall of Srebrenica. Interviews with these officials and Western European diplomats make it possible to reconstruct in detail how the United States government and its allies responded at a key turning point in the Bosnian civil war.

American intelligence agencies began observing a Bosnian Serb military buildup around Srebrenica in late June. There were reports that Bosnian Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic was furious about a series of raids by Srebrenica-based Muslim troops on neighboring Serb

villages, and that he wanted to teach the Bosnian government a lesson. U.S. intelligence analysts concluded, however, that the Serb aim was to "neutralize" the enclave rather than take it over all together.

As the Bosnian Serbs, spearheaded by Yugoslav army tanks, advanced to within a mile or two of the center of Srebrenica in early July, there was a flurry of consultations among Western capitals over the possibility of defending the enclave.

On July 9, the Dutch defense minister gave a bleak assessment of the military situation to the U.S. ambassador in The Hague. He reported that the Dutch peacekeepers were "surrounded, outnumbered, and afraid of further actions" by the Bosnian Serbs. Voorhoeve described the city as "undefensible," even though he still felt that the Serbs probably would not attempt to overrun it entirely.

According to the Dutch Defense Ministry, on the evening of July 10 the local garrison of Dutch peacekeepers requested large-scale NATO airstrikes. They expected NATO warplanes to begin attacking Serb positions early the following morning. But the raids were delayed until the afternoon, and they succeeded in neutralizing, at most, two Serb tanks. At 6 p.m. that evening, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable, the Dutch defense ministry conceded that the enclave had fallen.

U.S. officials immediately braced for possible horrors to come. "After Srebrenica fell, everybody said atrocities were going to happen," said one senior U.S. intelligence official.

Further airstrikes were effectively ruled out, because of the large number of hostages in Bosnian Serb hands. The Clinton administration now had only one place to turn for help: Milosevic. Despite a cooling in relations be-

of Bosnian Serb War Crimes

tween Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb proteges, U.S. officials felt that the Serbian president was their best bet for trying to restrain the vengeful fury of the victors of Srebrenica.

"We do not have evidence of direct involvement by Milosevic [in the Bosnia atrocities], but at the same time we felt that he could prevent things from happening," said an official involved in the frantic U.S. effort to forestall atrocities. "His ability as an interlocutor was on the line."

On July 12, as Mladic's forces began to separate fighting-age Muslims from women and children, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Belgrade, Rudolf V. Perina, went to see Milosevic. He told him that the capture of the "safe area" was a serious blow to the peace negotiations then underway, and urged him to "cut off all military supplies" to the Bosnian Serbs.

The Serb leader replied that he was "stung" by the U.S. demarche. "Why blame me?" Milosevic said, according to a diplomatic cable from Belgrade. "I have been unable to contact Mladic." Milosevic went on to tell the American diplomat that he had been assured that the Bosnian Serb forces would not harm U.N. peacekeepers or Muslim civilians.

Another cause of concern for Washington was the reported presence in the Srebrenica region of a notorious Serb militia leader, Zeljko Raznatovic, more commonly known as "Arkan." U.S. officials said they have repeatedly urged Milosevic to restrain Arkan, who operates out of Yugoslav territory and is believed to have close ties to the Yugoslav army. U.S. intelligence reports suggest that Arkan now has returned to his home base of eastern Slavonia after terrorizing Muslim and Croat inhabitants of Serb-controlled territory in northern Bosnia.

A day after the fall of the "safe area," according to U.S. officials and refugee accounts, Serb military forces herded at least 600 Muslim men from the city into a soccer field in the village of Nova Kasaba, northwest of Srebrenica. As they huddled in a circle surrounded by guards, a U.S. recon-

naissance satellite snapped a grim, shocking photo of the group.

The men subsequently were taken from the site in groups to two nearby fields, lined up, and machine-gunned. The Serbs buried the dead in mass graves and bulldozed the entire area. A similar group of at least 400 men in the village of Sandic also was captured on satellite imagery, shortly before they too were trucked away and slain in moonlight on a nearby field. Those photos were not released to the public.

Word of the atrocities—or imminent atrocities—reached Washington on the evening of July 13. After Sacirbey tipped off Albright, she in turn phoned White House deputy national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger. At Berger's suggestion, Albright asked the intelligence community the next day to try to find corroborating evidence.

But it is not clear whether the task was given much urgency. Several officials said, for example, that the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), which has a special group assigned to analyze satellite and U-2 spy-plane imagery of Bosnia, was not assigned the task in mid-July of looking for atrocities or mass graves.

Instead, the analysts devoted most of their time to trying to find fresh information about a Serb attack on Zepa and movements of Serb weaponry, including any air defense batteries that could endanger U.S. and allied pilots engaged in possible retaliatory strikes. As a result, the photos languished in NPIC archives until the evening of Aug. 2, when they were unearthed by an analyst who linked them with the nearby grave sites.

After their existence was reported on Aug. 4 in the National Intelligence Daily, a classified newsletter circulated to senior policymakers, Albright asked for a briefing that she could pre-

sent to the U.N. Security Council. On Aug. 10, she told a closed meeting of the Council that "we have seen these signs [of mass graves] again and again in territory taken by the Serbs—around Brcko; in northwest Bosnia; and most notoriously outside Vukovar," where 200 Croat hospital patients are believed by international human rights organizations to be buried in mass graves.

"People were completely stunned," Albright said later about her colleagues on the Council. She and other U.S. officials are convinced that the disclosure helped persuade Britain and France—which had long been gun-shy about taking decisive military action in Bosnia—to authorize a broad campaign of NATO bombing later in August.

But questions have since been raised in the European press and the Dutch government about whether the administration acted as quickly as it should have to ferret out the information and publicize it. The Dutch defense ministry, which has been under intense fire at home for not doing more to stop the atrocities, demanded in August that Washington provide a detailed account of what it knew and when.

According to that account, which was provided to the Dutch defense minister by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry in early September, the administration did not have "any information on any Bosnian Serb Army intent to commit atrocities" in or around Srebrenica. But the chronology adds that "we did know of the possibility of such activity given the history of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans."

On July 17, according to the account, the CIA's Bosnia Task Force wrote in its classified daily report that numerous accounts by refugees "provide details that appear credible" of atrocities being committed but added that "we lack authoritative, detailed information to substantiate this information." The intelligence officials declined to say what they did during this period to try to redress the deficiency.

"It was not a military priority," said one official. "A lot of this [atrocities] stuff is not looked at" at the time it is collected, the official said.

But several officials said the pace of the search for information quickened after July 25, when the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, sent a highly classified, "No Distribution" cable to Secretary of State Warren Christopher recounting testimony by a massacre survivor to U.N. human rights interviewers in Muslim-controlled Tuzla.

Galbraith's cable said that the account, which he heard secondhand from a friend, "provides disturbing evidence that the Bosnian Serbs have massacred many if not most of the 5,000-plus military-age men in their custody." As one official said, "this thing was qualitatively different [from earlier reports about atrocities], because it involved systematic organized killings of large numbers of human beings."

Another official said, "When I read


that report, I said, 'God damn, they are doing it again.'" Christopher immediately ordered John Shattuck, the assistant secretary of state for human rights, to visit the region, where he met with the refugee survivor and collected additional firsthand accounts. On July 27, according to the account, a U-2 making a weekly pass over the area snapped photos of freshly dug earth at various fields. The photos offered a contrast with earlier photos showing no disturbance.

Several officials said the additional, secret evidence of mass grave sites includes aerial photography of disturbed earth in three locations near the town of Sahanici, near Karakaj, which confirms an Oct. 3 report published earlier by the Boston Globe. The site is significant because it is at least 20 miles from the route taken by the refugees when they left Srebrenica, disproving Bosnian Serb claims that any mass graves contain only Muslims killed "in combat."


One official said that the administration has not divulged all the evidence of mass graves in part because it is no longer "on a mission . . . to dispel doubts" that atrocities occurred, one official said.

Albright said "the great frustration of this whole horror show is that you can never get information in real time" from U.N. officials in Bosnia. But she added that she is satisfied that "the system worked as well as it could to put the information together. I obviously wish I'd had it sooner, but it was not possible to have it sooner."

Other senior officials said, however, that the intelligence community should begin examining how it can use satellite imagery more effectively in public diplomacy aimed at exposing or deterring war crimes, rather than restricting its use to military purposes. The Srebrenica massacre "is going to change" the intelligence community's priorities, one official said.



This U-2 spy plane photograph was among the first to show what analysts believe are mass grave sites near Srebrenica—the reworkments are thought to have been constructed to protect heavy trucks and earth-moving equipment from shelling. The map at right shows reported massacre sites identified by eyewitnesses and human rights groups before U.S. officials revealed that they had evidence of six sites other than those previously disclosed.



BY RICHARD FURIO—THE WASHINGTON POST.